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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this interlocutory appeal pursuant
to UCA § 78-2-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether under the undisputed facts the claims of First Equity Federal, Inc., on
its own behalf and on behalf of Aspen Meadows Homeowners Association ("First Equity")
should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The

appellate court reviews the trial court's conclusions on a motion to dismiss for correctness,
without according deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Thiele v. Anderson, 975
P.2d 481 (Ut.App. 1999).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Rule 41(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure determines Skabelund's
appeal. Rule 41 (a) (1) provides:
[A]n action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of
court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service
by the adverse party of an answer or other response to the
complaint permitted under these rules. Unless otherwise stated
in the notice of dismissal, the dismissal is without prejudice,
except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed
in any court of the United States or of any state an action based
on or including the same claim.
(Emphasis added).

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This is a case brought by First Equity on behalf of itself and Aspen Meadows
Homeowners Association alleging negligent misrepresentation,fraud,breach of contract and
several other causes of action in connection with two large parcels of real property in Cache
County, Utah. The complaint seeks specific performance with respect to First Equity's
alleged rights under various contracts and agreements pertaining to the two parcels of
property. The complaint also seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief.
B.

Course of Proceedings

First Equity filed its complaint in this case on or about December 6, 2000.
Skabelund responded by filing a Motion to Dismiss based on the two dismissal provision of
Rule 41(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
C.

Disposition at Trial Court

Oral argument on Skabelund's Motion to Dismiss was conducted on March 26,
2001. On April 17, 2001 the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision denying
Skabelund's motion.
RELEVANT FACTS
On or about August 25,2000, First Equity Federal, Inc., on its own behalf and
on behalf of Aspen Meadows Homeowners Association and Rocky Mountain Financial,
L.L.C. filed an action against the following defendants in the First Judicial District Court,
Case No. 000101312PR: Phillips Development, LC, Peter O. Phillips, Lydia Phillips, Alden
2

B. Turnbow, Larry Andrews, John E. Phillips, Cache Title Company, North Logan City,
and John and Jane Does I-XXV. [R206] (A copy of First Equity's complaint is attached as
Addendum "A").
On or about September 17,2000, First Equity filed a second complaint against
the same defendants in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Northern
Division, Case No. 1:000CV109C. [R284] (A copy of this complaint is attached as
Addendum "B"). On or about September 22, 2000, First Equity filed Voluntary Dismissal
of Case Without Prejudice under U.R.Civ.P. 41 inks first-filed case. [R281] (A copy of the
September 22, 2000 dismissal is attached as Addendum "C")
On or about December 18, 2000, First Equity's second complaint was
dismissed by the Honorable Tena Campbell ("Judge Campbell") pursuant to a Motion to
Dismiss without Prejudice filed by First Equity. First Equity's Motion to Dismiss, attached
hereto as Appendix "D," included Skabelund as one of the additional defendants. [R349]
A copy of the Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss without Prejudice, which
included Skabelund as a named defendant, is attached as Addendum "E"1. [R352]
On or about December 6,2000, First Equity returned to First District Court and
filed its complaint in this case, comprising First Equity's third complaint alleging the exact
same claims. [R358] (A copy of First Equity's third complaint is attached hereto as
Addendum "G"). Skabelund filed a motion to dismiss based on the two dismissal provision

*On or about April 10, 2001, First Equity obtained a "clarification" of the order
dismissing the federal court case stating that the dismissal was without prejudice. [R508]
(See Order attached hereto as Addendum "F").
3

of Rule 41(a)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [R197]. The trial court denied Skabelund's
motion by Memorandum Decision on April 17, 2001. [R511] (See Addendum at "H").
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Rule 41 (a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure mandates dismissal of First
Equity' s complaint against Skabelund with prejudice. The Utah Supreme Court has affirmed
a Rule 41 (a) dismissal in a factually similar case. It is immaterial whether First Equity' s two
voluntary dismissals resulted in harassment or abuse where First Equity's dismissal of the
Federal Case was voluntary within the meaning of Rule 41 (a). Moreover, Skabelund should
be dismissed, even though he was not explicitly named as a defendant in First Equity' s initial
First District Court case, because of Skabelund's close relationship to the subject matter of
the litigation.
ARGUMENT
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE MANDATES
DISMISSAL OF FIRST EQUITY'S COMPLAINT AGAINST
SKABELUND WITH PREJUDICE
Rule 41(a)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, often referred to as the "two-dismissal
rule," applies to the voluntary dismissals of a plaintiff s cases and reads as follows:
[ A]n action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of
court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service
by the adverse party of an answer or other response to the
complaint permitted under these rules. Unless otherwise stated
in the notice of dismissal, the dismissal is without prejudice,
except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
4

upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed
in any court of the United States or of any state an action based
on or including the same claim.
(Emphasis added).
The complaints filed by First Equity in the First Judicial District Court on or
about August 25, 2000, and in United States District Court on or about September 17, 2000,
which First Equity voluntarily dismissed, contain the same claims as the third complaint now
before this Court. First Equity's prior complaints were based upon the same transactions and
factual allegations as those contained in this Complaint. Accordingly, First Equity's
voluntary dismissal of the second complaint operates as an adjudication on the merits. Rule
41(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that First Equity's third complaint
be dismissed with prejudice as against Skabelund.
A.

The Utah Supreme Court has Affirmed a Rule 41(a) Dismissal in a
Factually Similar Case

In Thomasv. Brajfet's Heirs, 305 P.2d 507 (Utah 1956) plaintiffs had similarly
filed and dismissed the same case twice. The trial court found that the court's second
dismissal at the request of the plaintiffs was an adjudication on the merits because of the
prior action's dismissal. Plaintiffs argued the trial court erred because the rule only provided
that a second dismissal by notice would operate as an adjudication on the merits, and that the
rule should not apply where the request for dismissal was actually presented to

5

the court and the court signed an order which recited that the dismissal was without
prejudice.
The Utah Supreme Court, looking to federal case law, concluded that a recital
that the dismissal was without prejudice in the order of dismissal had no effect. Citing
Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Co. v. Noma Electric Corp. 10 F.R.D. 32, 34. (D. Md. 1950),
the Thomas court concluded that a plaintiff could not defeat the express language of the rule
by the mere recital in its notice of dismissal that it was without prejudice. The court held that
whether the plaintiff files a notice of dismissal, or the court signs an order prepared by the
plaintiff, it is an ex, parte dismissal without notice to the other side. The Thomas court
described the purpose of Rule 41(a)(1) as follows:
The purpose of Rule 41(a)(1) was to provide a simple and
speedy method for a plaintiff to dismiss his action. Yet it was
deemed necessary that there be a limitation upon this procedure
in order to prevent vexatious suits and delays in litigation by
repetitious filings and dismissals. One may wonder how such
dismissals could vex or annoy a defendant who had not
appeared or whether the rule is good or bad in its overall effect.
However, we are here concerned only with the rule as it is, and
whether the two dismissals act as an adjudication and preclude
further litigation. So long as it is extant a plaintiff should not be
able, in a perfunctory dismissal, to escape its consequences by
the simple device of including in the order a recital that the
dismissal is without prejudice.
Id. at 514.
The Thomas court concluded, "[i]n the instant case, from aught that appears
on the record, the prior dismissals were made in a perfunctory manner. The trial court
6

it exists such dismissals operated as an adjudication
against the plaintiffs upon the merits." hi. at 514 (emphasis added).
The factual situation here is similar to that addressed by the Thymus ^mi:.
First Equity filed and dismissed two complaints. The second dismissal was accomplished by
motion and order. First Equity drafted the second oidci >I ilr missal
u

i

I

respective of that recital, the dismissal of First

Equity's second complaint should operate as an adjudication on the merits, pursuant to Rule
41(a), as it did in the Thomas case.
The trial court's Memorandum Decision focuses on Thomas' use of the word
"perfunctory" a* rmr r.^si^ hn acnstu± ^kabUun,
c

'lotion to Dismiss
h.: .. :

"Tin/1 (in! nunil

ithin the. meaning of

Thomas because plaintiff claimed to have had no choice in seeking the dismissal. However,
the Thomas court made clear that "perfunctory" means not giving adverse parties in the case
notice of plaintiff "s request foi dismissal lbv mo

*

a 111BI 111 n > 11 of llif i miff spmfirallv to that issue. Id. at 513-514.
In llii

i ii ml ii|>|Viir i Ihiil Iiisl h|uih \ Mum v nl I hsmiss.il in ilic fir si \ ase

a lie! motion and order of dismissal in the Federal Case were not served on any opposing

parties or counsel and were, in the sense intended by the Utah Supreme Court in Thomas,
perfunctory.2
B.

It is Immaterial Whether First Equity's Two Voluntary Dismissals
Resulted in Harassment or Abuse

The trial court's Memorandum Decision in this case also concludes First
Equity's second dismissal did not result in "harassment or abuse of the system." The court
opined that there had been no "compromise or vexatious result affecting the Defendant
because the first two cases were filed but no service occurred", and concluded "the Plaintiff
should not be punished for doing the right thing."
As noted in Thomas at 514, although the Utah Supreme Court questioned
whether the rule was "good or bad in its overall effect," the court also applied the rule "as
it exists", and stated that the plaintiff should not be able to escape its consequences. In this
case the trial court should have applied the rule "as it exists", and dismissed First Equity's
third complaint without reference to whether it was punishing First Equity "for doing the
right thing."

2

The trial court stated in its Memorandum Decision: "[I]t should be noted that this
was not a perfunctory dismissal. The dismissal was for lack of jurisdiction and
voluntarily filled by the Plaintiff, because it would have been dismissed in any event by
the Court itself absent Plaintiffs motion or on motion by the Defendant." (Memorandum
Decision, p. 2).
8

nil < 'ouil i( Aiipr.'il'. in null ; .iildirssed this s.imc issue in LaAr
at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. i Pacific Malibu Development Corp., 933 F.2d 724 (9th
Cir. 1991), cert, denied 503 U.S. 920, 112 S Ct 1:295 (1/992:) In Lake, tin: Ninth < m nil
In hi III ill ni [ilLiiiilill < rtMiMiHi

11 ii s i r h i i i 1 J

d u n l i n iliMiin 1 il limit i Null

lilii.iii " i n

irrelevant in applying the rule and that an actual intent to harass or abuse the defendants was
not required for application of the rule, stating "the rule does not require an inquiry into the
circumstances of the two dismissals." I d, at / 2 7 3
^

First Equity' s Dismissal of the Federal Case was Voluntary Within
the Meaning of Rule 41(a)

The Lake court also made short shrift of plaintiffs argument that it had no
choice but to dismiss one of its previously filed suits and that accordingly Rule 41(a) should
I

involuntary, because after the bankruptcy of defendant Peter O. Phillips was dismissed, First
Equity had no choice other than dismissing its claim filed in federal court. The Lake opinion
states that "the term 'voluntary ' ' in Rule 41 means that the party is filing a dismissal without

''Ilie Lake court notes that "a few cases have suggested that, in certain limited
circumstances, the rule will not be literally applied, citing Poloron Prod., Inc. v. Lybh.;.<id
Ross Bros. & Montgomery, 534 F.2d 1012, 1017-18 (2d Cir. 1976). The Lake court goes
on to distinguish Poloron and observes that its "holding" when followed, has been limited
to its facts and does not preclude application of [Rule 41 (a)'s] Bat where the voluntary
dismissal is unilateral." Id at 727. •
9

being compelled by another party or the court. It does not mean that other circumstances
might have not compelled the dismissal or that the party desired it." Id. at 726.
The Lake court goes on to state:
Rule 41 distinguishes between voluntary or section (a),
dismissals and involuntary, or section (b), dismissals on the
basis of which party initiates the dismissal. And, while it
delineates the bases upon which the defendant may seek an
involuntary dismissal, it does not consider the plaintiff s reasons
for seeking a voluntary dismissal.
Id.
The Lake court observed that the plaintiff in that case had alternatives to filing
for voluntary dismissal, such as allowing defendants to move for a dismissal or registering
the plaintiff corporation and then filing a motion with the court to have its case voluntarily
dismissed pursuant to Rule 41 (a)(2). Similarly, in this case First Equity could have allowed
defendants in the Federal case to move for dismissal or could have pursued the remand
motion it originally brought after dismissal of the Phillips bankruptcy case. Instead, First
Equity voluntarily initiated the second dismissal, an action it should have known would
trigger mandatory dismissal with prejudice of any third-filed case under Rule 41(a).

10

;kabehind Should be Dismissed, Even Though he was not Explicitly
Named as a Defendant in First Equity's Initial First District Court
Case.
i

;

mplaint filed oo, \u<;ust 25, 2000,

named John and Jane Does I-XXV as defendants. W ith respect to the "Doe" defendants the
complaint stated as follows:
Defendants John and Jane Does I-XXV are persons and entities
L
unknown to the plaintiffs at this time \\>
^ ^ artrd ;~
concert with or on behalf of named Defendants or othe^
the
detriment of Plaintiffs or have clouded title to the nr
ies
4 a
rt
si lbject " -' - ^" n.
Appendix "A", paragraph »* i
In paragraphs 64-75, 82-88, 100, 102 and 109, First Equity's first-filed
complaint described specific acts undertaken and representations made by Skabelund along
with defendant I Vlcr () Hullips.
In the Federal Court action filed in September, 2000, although the complaint
caption does not specifically iM 11 ii MJIHJKIHI I . »I ildm dim 11» • •• spiTifn «iH< IUHIK'HI
defe*

i

caption to the Motion to Dismiss and the Order of Dismissal signed by

Judge Campbell.
In a similar case, Manning v. South Carolina Dept. Highway and Public
Transportation, / a J 914 F ? J 4 4 (Mh Circuit 1 9Q0N thr rourt ruled that a named defendant
who had been named as a ,>... .is ....

*- ..i : i .

,

>.

ti

;

-.

Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff had filed a Section 1983 action
in Federal Court against the highway department and a number of John Does, stating:
John Doe and Richard Roe are individuals employed by the
Federal or State Governments whose identities are at this time
unknown to the Plaintiffs but who joined and participated in the
acts and omissions set forth herein.
Id. at 46.
The complaint was voluntarily dismissed by notice. The second complaint was
filed in state court and specifically named one of the John Does defendants as the state
deputy attorney general. This suit was also dismissed by notice. The third lawsuit named
the state official specifically. The court dismissed the state official who had been named as
a John Doe defendant, stating:
[R]es judicata extends not only to named parties to an action,
but also to their privies. (Citation omitted) . . . . [T]he term
"privy", when applied to a judgment or decree, means one so
identified in interest with another that he represents the same
legal right. One in privity is one whose legal interests were
litigated in the former proceeding . . . "Privity" as used in the
context of res judicata or collateral estoppel, does not embrace
relationships between person or entities, but rather it deals with
a person's relationship to the subject matter of the litigation.
M a t 48.
The court held that since the state official was intended to be the defendant
Doe named in the plaintiffs first action, the state official's legal rights were implicated in
the initial suit, and therefore dismissal based on the two-dismissal rule was appropriate.
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Hen; m i i. h i i I i il

.illi ;,jihoii

m I if %1 I -quitv's state and federal

c inclusion of Skabelund among the defendants whom First Equity
dismissed in the federal suit, that Skabelund was one of the John Doe delendants who ,K k tl
in concert with or on behalf of named Defendants <' »ili " *• i »• IM • dvn inicin ni P l a i n t i f f s . "
Thei -

. •

' that Skabelund is in privity with the other defendants named

in the first and second lawsuits for the purposes of Rule 41(a).
CONCLUSION
First Equity s< nmpliiuil slmulil hi tlr mi* Mil "villi prejudice pursuant to Rule
4

Hivil Procedure.
I

-

tin

HI "i »i i (nil

>00i
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